Hm. I'm not convinced by his reasoning. He seemed to suggest that the reason it's unconstitutional is because he couldn't find (I'm not making it up)
any supporting Appellate court cases. This, to me, seems unlikely, being that two other judges apparently did.
Doing some quick pre-final research:
Wrote the Court in Lynchburg, "Congress can regulate... activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." The Court needed only to determine whether there was a "rational basis" for concluding that the regulated activity would substantially affect interstate commerce, not absolutely determine that it would. That impact has to be more than just incidental to a few individuals, and even purely local activities, should they affect interstate commerce, can be regulated.
Liberty University, that bastion of rational thought (

), argued that failure to buy insurance was simply a state of being, and wasn't commercial, and couldn't affect interstate commerce. but the State responded that it's often a conscious choice, and it increases costs to healthcare providers and to the government. When it is a conscious thought, it's usually because someone has chosen not to buy insurance until they got sick, and then they want it, and that makes it more expensive. LU also argued that they weren't economic in nature, like a gun-free school zone law that got struck down and a regulation having something to do with marijuana. The court didn't buy it for the above reasons (after all, it can't be both non-economic and a free-market choice, right, Stebo?).
Here's how interstate commervce comes into play, and it has to do with a classic court case that deals with wheat: even if it's a purely local activity, it will have an affect on the local prices that exist on a national market. Wrote the Court, "Because of the nature of supply and demand, Plaintiffs' choices directly affect the price of insurance in the market, which Congress set out in the Act to control."
The only reason the Court in the ruling yesterday didn't find what he was looking for was because he narrowed his question to the point of intentionally trying to spot something that doesn't exist. He went from a question of traditional, precedented Constitutional interpretation to a question of first impression, so that his own legal theories could apply.