Ugh. I didn't want to have to go through this in this thread, Stebo, but you force my hand.
stebo0728 wrote:Really? There is no disproportion in the amount of state legislatures in each state. There is no need, assuming you let the Senate do its intended job, to have a varying number of Senators based on population. Each state has one state legislature, and is represented in Washington by 2 appointed Senators.
The Senate, as originally created, served two masters.
1. Antimajoritarian principles.
2. State governments as governments.
The Seventeenth Amendment eliminated the latter, but the former is alive and well.
stebo0728 wrote:In fact, if you were to try and proportion Senators based on population, then you would be giving one state advantages over another. For instance, lets say a bill was being considered that would force all states to be "right to work" states. If union states decided to team up, and had a disproportionate amount of Senators because of population differences, then the bill would be easily killed. Or say the tables were turned, and the bill sought to force all states to be union states, the same disproportion may be able to easily force this bill upon the disapproving states. There in lies the problem, even now, a large portion of PEOPLE in a "right to work" state could force their Senator to vote against the interests of the state, because they are beholden to he who votes.
What you just identified is the first master, not the second. Yes, there is a purpose served by limiting the
number of Senators to two per State, and that is to balance out the power of the most populous states, which is most clearly present in the House of Representatives. But it doesn't really matter who elects those Senators - the vote will be the same no matter what in your example, because you're talking about regional interests. That's why I'm fine with leaving the Senate the way it is, because there's little gained by increasing the number of Senators.
A better example of the the second master would be if Congress sought to pass an Amendment to the Constitution that required States to participate in the creation of air quality standards, on a national board. It might just be that the People want that, and they might want it overwhelmingly in each State. But the State legislatures, knowing that they are not prepared to make these kinds of determinations, and aren't capable of footing that kind of bill, might kill it in equally overwhelming levels of force. The difference between this example and the last example is that we're not talking about regional differences, and the protection of less populous states (ensured by the equal number of senators per state), but we're talking about institutional interests, which were, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, preserved by the appointment of Senators by State legislatures.
Because of the commandeering doctrine, as developed by the Supreme Court over time, and because of the relative rarity of successful constitutional amendments, I don't see how the State legislatures need that much more protecting from the federal government. Congress cannot regulate the States as States, cannot require State legislatures to pass laws it demands, cannot require State executive officers to enforce the laws it makes, and, just this term, placed new limits on how Congress may enforce its "power of the purse" against States.
The risk of cronyism, on the other hand is certainly worth warding off, and I see no reason to suppose that the Seventeenth Amendment hasn't been successful in warding off that kind of corruption, or that there's the political will in taking action against it after the Seventeenth Amendment is repealed. After all, who's going to make the law to stop it?
stebo0728 wrote:Fair enough, but I was basing my comment on prior discussions we've had, and you usually seem to take about the same line, which is why I questioned you're understanding of the issue.
I think at this point, my understanding of the issue should no longer be in question.