Not sure you're on solid ground there, Matt.
First, the battle over the General Welfare Clause was all but lost six decades ago in United States v. Butler (1936) and Helvering v. Davis (1937). In Butler, the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which taxed processors in order to pay farmers to reduce production. Although invalidating the statute, the Court adopted the Hamiltonian view (almost in passing) that the General Welfare Clause is a separate grant of congressional authority, linked to and qualified by the spending power. Sorenson perceives correctly that virtually all governmental activity involves the expenditure of money; accordingly, there is little difference between Hamilton’s view and Crosskey’s position that the General Welfare Clause represents a plenary grant of power.
Any doubt remaining after Butler as to the scope of the General Welfare Clause was dispelled a year later in Helvering. There the Court defended the constitutionality of the 1935 Social Security Act, requiring only that welfare spending be for the common benefit as distinguished from some mere local purpose. Justice Benjamin Cardozo summed up what has become controlling doctrine ever since: "Nor is the concept of the general welfare static.... What is critical or urgent changes with the times."
Justice Harlan Stone struck the final blow in Flemming v. Nester in 1954, holding that questions concerning the propriety of conditions imposed on spending, and questions concerning the generality of the benefits, were for the Congress to resolve–-subject to judicial invalidation "only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification." However disheartening such cases may be to advocates of a narrower and more constraining General Welfare Clause, they do reinforce the urgent need for quality research from competent scholars like Sorenson.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-11.html