WARNING, THOROUGH ANALYSIS AHEAD.
(Scroll to last paragraph if you don't want to read it all)
So I'm looking at the Court's actual opinion, found
here. I'm going to be writing this as I read it, so what's at the beginning of this post may not be entirely consistent with what's at the end, so please bear with me.
The arguments the plaintiffs put forward is that this discriminates against homosexuals, because heterosexual partners have a way to resolve the issue and get coverage for their chosen partner: get married. In Arizona, homosexual partners are prevented from using that route. The Court agrees with this reasoning. This may be how we get to a disparate situation that Greg was informed of. Writes the Court:
While Section O is not discriminatory on its face, as applied Section O "unquestionably imposes different treatment on the basis of sexual orientation," and makes benefits available on terms that are a legal impossibility for gay and lesbian couples.
The State argued that they were aiming for cost savings, but the plaintiffs argue that you can't violate the Equal Protection Clause to do it (which, the Court explains, says that, while you can treat different classes of citizens differently, you can't do it for reasons entirely unrelated to the law itself - sexual orientation is not pertinent to employment benefits). The Court agrees with the plaintiffs here, too. The Judge wrote:
The court must agree, for the Supreme Court has held that, although "a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs," the State may not attempt to "limit its expenditures . . . by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens." That proposition applies here because the spousal limitation in Section O rests on an invidious distinction between heterosexual and homosexual State employees who are similarly situated.
The Court mentions that 800 employees get benefits for their domestic partners, and a "small fraction" of them get benefits for their same-sex domestic partners. The plaintiffs argue that the cost savings for that fraction is "far less" than 0.5% of the costs of the 800. The rest of it could foreseeably be shifted through marriage, for literally no cost savings. On the other hand, it causes increased costs because of reduced paying in. Writes the Court:
Moreover, if the State's interest were "simply saving money, the companion goal of promoting marriage would seem to do the opposite." If Section O succeeds in promoting marriage, the State will have to provide health benefits to more people, thus increasing the State's expenditures.
The State argued that the law should stand on the basis of administrative efficiency; that limiting "dependant" to mean "spouse" means that it's a less complicated thing to administer. The plaintiffs again argued that this doesn't justify an illegal discrimination, either. Citing the Supreme Court's past reasoning, the Court here agreed. Writes the Court:
The Supreme Court noted in Frontiero v. Richardson that "although efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance, 'the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.'"
The State then had the gall to blatantly argue that heterosexual employees were worth more than homosexual employees. Again, the Court, emphasis mine:
Plaintiffs argue that the State’s rationale is discriminatory on its face, and not a rational state interest. The court concurs. The State’s justification raises "the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected," namely toward same-sex domestic partners who by law cannot become spouses. "If the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."
Lest we think that the State was actually trying to say that married couples with children are better for the State, the Court recognizes that the state made that claim
separately (that promoting marriage was in the State's interest), and addresses it next. The Court says that, while the interest of promoting marriage is served by limiting benefits from heterosexual domestic partners, it is not served by limiting benefits from homosexual domestic partners:
The Supreme Court has characterized marriage as "the most important relation in life," but construing the facts of the complaint as true it cannot be said that Section O’s distinction between heterosexual and homosexual employees is legitimately, rationally, and substantially related to promoting that interest. Certainly, that aspect of Section O which is challenged, the denial of benefits to State employee's same-sex domestic partners, cannot promote marriage because gays and lesbians are ineligible to marry.
And that's why the Judge passed the injunction that he did:
Defendants are enjoined from enforcing A.R.S. § 38-651(O) to eliminate family insurance eligibility for lesbian and gay State employees, and their domestic partners and domestic partners' children who satisfy the criteria set forth in Ariz. Admin. Code § R2-5-101.
The Court apparently agreed with the State of Arizona that Arizona's interests were furthered by limiting benefits from heterosexual domestic partnerships (in that promoting marriage is in their interests), but not by limiting benefits from homosexual domestic partnerships (who can't marry anyways, so there's no marriage to promote). That's why you got the pamphlet you got - same-sex domestic partners can get benefits, but opposite-sex domestic partners can't, because the Court recognizes that the State of Arizona is telling them to get married if they want the benefits.